fort monroe

A View from the Top

Admiral Jlames O. Ellis, U.S. Navy

CommandeMn-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
Commanded Allied Forces Southern Europe

ai

Commander, Joi)it Tai Force NOBLE ANVIL
during OpereM ALLIED FORCE

This Is .

and Is Nd

This is NOT:

★ The story of the ALLIED FORCE air campaign

D Statistics, facts and figures

□ What your staffs and component commanders can tell
you better than I

□ AIL good news

This IS an attempt to give you:

D A senior Commander's unique perspectives and very
personal opinions

□ Thoughts on how the next Joint Force Commander
can fight his campaign even better

D A springboard for open and frank discussion

ere

The most precise and lowest collateral
damage air campaign... in history [

* Achieved, all objectives ... at the strategic,
operational and tactical levels of war

0 Zero aircrews lost in 78 days of round-the-clock ops
and over 38,000 combat sorties

0 NATO's largest combat operation in its history

0 13 of 19 allies contributed forces... 305 aircraft,
almost 15,000 sorties

0 Many operational firsts... but most importantly...

FRY forces are out of_Kosoyo ... and the process
of recovery is well underway under KFOR

Is Much Good New^

§°r %

Operational Firsts

Impressive combat debuts:

□ B-2 / JDAM "Global Reach— Global Power" concept

□ SLAM-equipped P-3C AIP

□ TLAMs launched by the Royal Navy — 21 launched from
HMS SPLENDID (and reloaded in-theater)

□ C-17 made possible the first-time air deployment of a
major, multi-role Army force of Mis, M2s, MLRS, 105 and
155 howitzers, and engineer equipment

D JWAC Tier-4 Collateral Damage predictive modeling
validated. ..time after time.. .in combat

And broad, multi-dimensional non-combat theater
ops continued unabated...

The Air Campaign

Highly effective and superbly executed... but politically
constrained

★ Air power was an effective "arrow," but it was only one
arrow in our "quiver"... needed to be complemented by
other arrows to be maximally effective

0 Air strikes were effective against VJ armor only after the
UCK launched its major offensive

D UCK forced the defending forces to uncover and mass their
armor and mechanized forces

0 Q36/Q37 highly effective in identifying VJ indirect fire
assets... but work remains on "sensor-to-shooter"

After the air campaign, significant ground forces were still
required to occupy and secure the area.

Planning and Posturing

Just what is a major campaign?

★ If Serbia took 78 days....

□ Is everything except SWA and Korea to be a "No
Plan" start?

What does that portend for planning,
presence levels and required capabilities?
D CVBG / ARG presence in the EUCOM AOR?

□ Army mobility and deployability?

D Joint war reserves and sustainability?

□ Hjjrhe future of low density / high demand assets?

Short War Syndrome

We called this one absolutely, wrong ...

★ Affected much of what followed:

* JTF activation, staff composition, facilities, command
and control, logistics and execution

* Lack of a coherent campaign planning

* Lack of adequate component staffing

* The race to find suitable targets

□ OPLAN focused on brief, single-dimension combat

* Deception, diversion & feint opportunities lost

* We failed to plan for branches and sequels

What will we do next time?

Activation in a Crisis

JTF-NA was not formed around a pre-
designated (and trained) theater staff

★ Past paradigms have focused on training and
planning for 3-star JTF Commanders only

0 But major coalition operations of this
magnitude require decisive and senior U.S.
leadership (4-star)

0 AFSOUTH / CNE was uniquely positioned to
synchronize U.S. and alliance operations

D CINCUSNAVEUR staff formed the core cadre...
effective, but not optimal

Implications for theater postures for
future?

n Traininn and hrnarl invpcfmpnt rpnuirpH

*** F

orming a JTF Next Time

Requirement for “JTF in a Box"

★ Plan for fully-functional JTF and component staffs
/ Identify.. .or build. ..facilities, connectivity, SOPs
Develop an augmentee database and training

program

o

Use commercial systems, Joint Communications
Support Element (JCSE), Deployable JTF
Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC)

Information Management Plan & C4I facility needed
for staff, components... and alliance members!

CNE already working these for Europe

^V^The Political Environment flr"

★ % €lr

Affects every aspect of planning and execution

★ Caused "incremental war" instead of decisive
operations

□ Excessive collateral damage concerns created

sanctuaries ...and opportunities. ..for the adversary —
which were successfully exploited

□ We did not anticipate the difficulties of NATO out-of-
charter operations

n Ruling out a ground option corrupted JFLCC continuity,
removed campaign planning, challenged C2, and
resulted in a hasty last minute ground planning effort

Ruling Out Ground
Operations

■bif ^

Lack of the credible threat of ground invasion
probably prolonged the air campaign

* Although never committed to action, TF HAWK was
"their worst nightmare" for enemy forces in Kosovo

* The focus of a particularly effective PSYOP effort

□ Our only "sequential plan" was to do more of the
same.. .with more assets

□ Only the enemy could decide the war was over

Never say never... or deny yourself credible
options

e Ground Component

Lack of a Ground Component Commander
was a mistake

★ Even absent a combat ground offensive, the
planning and staffing capabilities that an
ARFOR would have provided were needed

D Shifted significant ground planning
responsibilities to the JTF staff — only
marginally prepared to handle myriad issues
pertaining to Initial Entry Force for Kosovo and
TF FALCON

You won't always know what you need
until you need it

impse at Urban

Not yet the "Three Block War". ..but not the Iraqi
desert either

★ Future campaigns will have more target areas like
Belgrade than Basra. ..or Route Pack I

□ Ups the political constraints by an order of magnitude

□ Allows adversaries to utilize CNN to their best advantage...
yields informational "interior lines"

D Impacts across the spectrum of capabilities: ISR,
targeting, munitions, IO, collateral damage, world opinion,
coalitions, etc.

We were lucky... but luck is not a principle of war for
the next Commander

Warfar

Collateral Damage

The new “American Way of War''...

★ Proud to be an American... only nation in the world
with all the tools (analytic, modeling, platforms,
weapons, training, intelligence)

D But our allies cannot match us...

D And adversaries will inflict as much CD as possible

□ Very expensive. ..investment required to maintain and
improve capabilities (in all areas)

□ Creates public expectations. ..every incident is a
perceived failure and will be exploited publicly

Or self-inflicted asymmetric warfare?

Nodal Analysis

Properly done, enables great effects at greatly
reduced effort, risk and cost

★ Many successes... Electrical Power, POL, LOCs

D Achieved effects precisely in line with theater and JTF
strategic objectives

□ Always planned for systematic, follow-on attacks

□ Requires robust and sustained ISR and assessment...
beginning long before and continuing throughout

Enables system preservation as well as destruction...
for follow-on ops (e.g., road structures within
Kosovo for KFOR)

Two vignettes...

A War of Weather

We may own the night. ..but poor weather creates
sanctuaries and operational lulls

□ Precision-guided is no longer "good enough"

D We experienced greater than 50% cloud cover more than
70% of the time... and it wasn't the worst part of the year

□ Laser or EO-guided munitions cannot hit what the pilots
cannot see

D JDAM expenditure equaled the production rate

GPS-guidance is a requirement and the way
ahead... invest accordingly... allies too

Information Operations

At once a great success.. .and perhaps the greatest
failure of the war

★ First IO Cell activated at the JTF-level

D All the tools are in place. ..only a few were used

D Great people. ..with great access to leadership. ..but too
junior and from the wrong communities to have the
required impact on planning and execution

D Incredible potential. ..must become our asymmetric "point
of main effort". ..but not yet understood by war fighters...
and classified beyond their access

Properly executed, IO could have halved the length
of the campaign

^^Psychological Operations

More important than ever

★ Trust... and use... the
professionals

D Beware of amateurs who
"want to help"... with your
program

0 Your prerogatives may be
usurped. ..but don't
surrender them

D PSYOP is at once an art, a
science,...

And a force multiolier

Serbia at the Crossroads.

The bomb ins will not last fora er, although when it finis it up to you. Eaclulay that goes by
brings Serbia further unwanted destruction and increased isolation because of Milosevic’*
pogrom inKosovo-Metohija.

Now is the time to startthinkmg about the future. How will Serbia rebuild? Will any other country
even want to help, or will you have to rebuild all by yourself" Where do you envision yourself and
your country in a year; or in five years'* Whatkind ofburdenand future will this leave foryour
children?

Call on your leadershp to stop its atrocities in Kosov o-Metoltija and take positiv e steps to
resoke the crisis now.

The choice is yours. Do something about it.

"^^ublic Info & Public

m

rm

Not a shining moment for the U.S. or NATO

□ The enemy was better at this than we were... and far more
nimble

D The enemy deliberately and criminally killed innocents by
the thousands.. .but no one saw it

□ We accidentally killed innocents sometimes by the
dozens.. .and the world watched on the evening news

□ We were continuously reacting, investigating and trying to
answer "how could this happen?"

D Milosevic had informational "interior lines"

A much underutilized instrument of national and
alliance power... ignore it at your peril

***. Information Technology

Great technology.. .but needs controls ...

□ Information saturation is additive to "the fog of war"

□ The demand for info will always exceed the capability to
provide it... how much is enough ?

□ You can have too much staff coordination ... and for issues
that don't require it

D Still need to "push" critical info vice "posting it" on the
web page... no substitute for record traffic

D You can only manage from your DTC... you cannot lead [
from it

Uncontrolled, it will control you and your staffs. ..and
lengthen your decision-cycle times

Command

VTC

Used properly... a most powerful tool
* Ability to shorten decision cycles dramatically
0 Clear and unambiguous Commander's Intent
0 Obviates need for key commanders to be co-located
Used improperly...

□ A voracious consumer of leadership and key staff working
hours ... the trend towards glitzy graphics

0 No substitute for campaign planning and written orders

□ Subject to misinterpretation as key guidance is filtered down
to lower staff levels

0 Enables senior leadership to sink to past comfort levels...
discipline is required to remain at the appropriate level of
engagement and command

and truest

, ~Tl_eaders f
***

★

^ke-Looking IADS Roll-Bac

After 78 days of hard campaigning, we effected
little degradation on a modern IADS system

★ Redundant systems and well-trained operators with
the discipline to wait for a better opportunity

D Affected tactical employment of airpower throughout
the war (altitude restrictions)

D Required significant ISR and SEAD efforts throughout
the campaign (stressed LD/HD assets)

Will we train for this environment.. .or continue
to assume we can take IADS down early?

*★*

bw Density / High Deman

^-VASlf

ijfoV

Low density assets were absolutely in high demand

★ Impacts of this campaign will be felt for years (platforms,
systems, reliability, parts, personnel, retention,
replacement costs)

D The trend is in the wrong direction... the demand will only
get h/crher

0 The density cannot remain low

□ Regardless of service, an issue for joint funding at the
highest priority

D We do not leave home without them

And without them... we cannot leave home

Self-Inflicted Wounds in
Asymmetric Warfare

The enemy benefited from:

★ The NCA / NAC target approval processes
0 Our poor OPSEC posture (NATO and US)

0 Our inability to wage full IO campaign
0 Our self-suspension on cluster munitions
□ Our standards for limiting Collateral Damage
0 Our aversion to US casualties... and ground combat
0 Our reactive vs. proactive Public Info / Public Affairs

All of the above slowed the "Decide — Act" side of our
own OODA loops ... and reduced our control of the
operational tempo

The next adversary will as well... and may take
far better advantage of it

Final Thoughts

We succeeded. But what if...

0 The enemy had attacked front line allies with ground
forces... or theater ballistic missiles?

0 The enemy had gotten even a few POWs... or KIAs?

□ Invasion became the only option?

0 The FRY submarine had sortied?

□ We were still fighting in winter weather?

0 We'd expended our precision munitions stocks?

0 Public support had weakened or evaporated?

□ France. ..or Italy (bed down) ... had said "enough"?

□ North Korea or Iraq had attacked?

We won't know until the next time